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NATURALISTIC ETHICS AND 
THE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL 
Mark T. Nelson 
Philosophical naturalism is the world view which tries to describe and explain 
all aspects of reality in purely natural, i.e., non-supernatural terms. Such a 
world view is a cluster of views usually including atheism, physicalism, 
radical empiricism or naturalized epistemology, and some sort of moral rel-
ativism, subjectivism or nihilism. In this paper I examine a problem which 
arises when the naturalist offers the argument from evil for atheism. Since 
the argument from evil is a moral argument it cannot be effectively employed 
by anyone who holds the denatured ethical theories which the naturalist 
typically holds. In the context of these naturalist ethical theories, the argu-
ment from evil fails to provide good reasons for either the naturalist or the 
theist to disbelieve in the God of theism. Obviously, this does not prove that 
naturalism is false, or that the argument from evil is unsound, but rather that 
certain naturalists' use of the argument has been misguided. 
Introduction 
c. S. Lewis, in an account of his early life, reports of his late boyhood: 
I was at this time living, like so many Atheists and Antitheists, in a whirl of 
contradictions. I maintained that God did not exist. I was also very angry 
with God for not existing. I was equally angry with Him for creating a world. 
(Lewis, 1955, p. 115) 
Lewis, of course, recognizes his error here: one cannot coherently believe 
that God doesn't exist and also be angry with him because he created a world. 
Other thinkers, however, seem to commit a similar error without even the 
mitigating excuse of adolescence. The error I have in mind consists in arguing 
for a form of philosophical naturalism in a certain way. In discussing this 
error I shall proceed as follows: I shall describe the philosophical naturalist, 
I shall identify her various views, including her views on the existence of 
God and the nature of ethics, and I shall argue that, given her view of ethics, 
her arguments about God are misguided. 
This philosopher, whom I allege to be misguided, is perhaps best called a 
"naturalist;" she holds the world-view that reality is best described in purely 
natural, i.e., non-supernatural, non-transcendent terms. In fact, naturalism is 
really a cluster of views about both substantive and methodological issues: the 
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naturalistic or "scientific" account of reality in general, of humans in particular, 
of values and of judgment. 1Ypically, this cluster includes physicalism (entailing 
mindfbody monism), radical empiricism or "naturalized" epistemology, atheism 
or agnosticism, as well as some form of moral relativism or moral sUbjectivism. 
Such a view may also include commitments to nominalism and determinism. 
Obviously, most members of this cluster can be, and have been, held inde-
pendently of the others, yet, historically, these views seem to have had a 
natural affinity for each other. Jointly they constitute what William James 
called "tough-minded" philosophy, and they find adherents, or perhaps ap-
proximate adherents, in Lucretius, Hobbes, Hume, Russell, and Mackie. 
Tough-minded or not, there is a problem in certain arguments for this total 
view, but in order to show this, I shall need to single out two component 
views for examination first. 
Atheism and the Argument from Evil 
The first component view I shall examine is the naturalistic account of God 
and/or belief in God. The typical, thoroughgoing naturalist is, of course, not 
a theist. She may be an agnostic, claiming that there is no conclusive reason 
to suppose either that there is or that there is not a God, or she may be an 
atheist, claiming that there is in fact no God. I shall restrict my remarks to 
the second sort, the atheistic naturalist. 
The reasons usually offered for atheism are manifold and familiar, including 
the naturalistic explanation of religious experience and belief, the claim that 
since science has successfully explained more and more of reality, the theistic 
hypothesis is increasingly superfluous, and the general claim that we lack any 
strong evidence for the existence of such a being as God. Of course, these 
reasons, even if cogent, do not suffice to establish that God does not exist; rather, 
they tend to remove positive reason for believing that he does. The careful atheist 
generally goes further, and argues that there are positive reasons to suppose that 
God does not exist, the most important of which is the argument from evil. 
Well-known to most philosophical readers, the argument from evil finds its 
classic rhetorical expression in Epicurus, quoted approvingly by Philo, in 
Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: 
Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he 
able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? 
Whence then is evil? (Hume, 1779, p. 198) 
The argument implicit in Epicurus' questions can be stated formally as follows: 
(1) If there were an all-good, all-powerful God, then there would be little 
or no evil in the world. 
(2) But there is much evil in the world. 
(3) Therefore, there is no all-good, all-powerful God. 
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This version of the argument is clearly valid, so comment on the truth of the 
premises is in order. The case for premise (2) is generally regarded as straight-
forward, and is based on the empirical observation of things such as natural 
disasters, war, human cruelty and the moral jUdgment that these things are 
bad or evil.! The case for premise (1), on the other hand, is generally regarded 
is a little less straightforward. Few thinkers would regard (1) as self-evident; 
at any rate, it is fairly clearly not a truth of logic, in that its denial is not a 
logical contradiction.2 Rather, (1) is to be taken as the conclusion of another 
argument, also suggested by Epicurus' questions: 
(4) If there were an all-good God, he would want there to be little or no evil 
in the world. 
(5) If there were an all-powerful God, he could bring it about that there were 
little or no evil in the world. 
(6) Therefore, if there were an all-good, all-powerful God, he would want, 
and be able, to bring it about that there were little or no evil in the world. 
(7) Anytime an agent wants it to be the case that X, and is able to bring it 
about that X, then it is the case that X. 
(8) Therefore, if there were an all-good, all-powerful God, there would be 
little or no evil in the world. 
Obviously, this is not a sound argument, since (7) is false. 3 No doubt the 
argument can be revised and qualified, but for simplicity's sake, I will leave 
it in its unqualified form, especially since the above-mentioned defect is 
irrelevant to the present discussion, and the point I wish to make would apply 
to most revised versions as well. 
The point I wish to make concerns (4) in particular, the claim that an 
all-good God would want there to be little or no evil in the world. The sense 
of this claim is that God wouldn't be all-good if he didn't want a world with 
little or no evil in it. That is, he would somehow fail morally, if he didn't 
want such a world, or if he wanted a world with lots of evil and suffering in 
it. This failure could be understood as a failure to perform some duty, or 
perhaps in some other way, say, as a failure to exhibit some crucial virtue 
such as love. However this failure is to be understood, (4) must be construed 
as an essentially moral premise, and both those who accept premises like (4) 
and those who reject them seem to agree on this. Theodicist Richard Swin-
burne, for instance, states that 
The theodicist will claim that it is not morally wrong for God to create or 
permit the various evils, normally on the grounds that doing so is providing 
the logically necessary conditions of greater goods. The antitheodicist denies 
these claims by putting forward moral principles which have as consequences 
that a good God would not under any circumstances create or permit the evils 
in question. (Swinburne, 1977, p. 82) 
Similarly, antitheodicist 1. L. Mackie treats premises like (4) as essentially 
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moral premises, and criticizes attempts to judge God's goodness according 
to principles different from the principles of ordinary human goodness. 
Mackie approvingly refers to James Mill, who 
looked upon religion as the greatest enemy of morality, 'above all, by radi-
cally vitiating the standards of morals; making it consist in doing the will of 
a being, on whom it lavishes indeed all the phrases of adulation, but whom 
in sober truth it depicts as eminently hateful.' In effect God is being called 
good, while at the same time he is being described as bad, that is as having 
purposes and acting upon motives which in all ordinary circumstances we 
would recognize as bad .... (Mackie, 1982, p. 156) 
In sum, then, the argument from evil as I have represented it here is an 
essentially moral argument in that at least one of its premises is itself a moral 
judgment or is based on a moral jUdgment.4 Moreover, so is every other 
version of the argument, so far as I know. 
Naturalism and Ethics 
Having characterized the argument from evil as an essentially moral argu-
ment, I wish to examine the "fit" between this pre-eminent argument for 
atheism, and the view of morality ordinarily associated with philosophical 
naturalism. I tum, then, to a brief discussion of the naturalistic picture of 
morality.' 
The naturalistic picture of morality-and of value generally-is largely 
derivative from other aspects of the naturalistic world view, especially from 
naturalistic views on science. Generally, the naturalist supposes that what he 
thinks of as the "scientific" picture of the world is largely correct, at least 
more correct than any other picture of the world, so in the event of conflict 
between what he takes to be the claims of science and the claims of some 
other source or discipline, the claims of science win.6 
To this view on science, the naturalist adds a view on the nature of morality, 
the view that if morality were to work the way it has been traditionally 
conceived to work, the world would have to contain certain unusual things.7 
Mackie, for instance, insists that 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or 
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from everything in the uni-
verse. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by 
some faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our 
ordinary ways of knowing everything else. (Mackie, 1977, p. 38) 
As soon as the naturalist realizes that her naturalistic, scientific picture of the 
world does not have room for such sui generis moral entities, she usually 
concludes that morality cannot be the objective, universal and necessary 
affair that it was once taken to be.8 Gilbert Harman owns up to this conclusion 
explicitly when he notes that 
372 Faith and Philosophy 
... a 'naturalist' as I am here using the term is not just someone who supposes 
that all aspects of the world have a naturalistic location in this way, but rather 
someone who takes it to be of overriding importance in doing moral philos-
ophy to attempt to locate moral properties. My claim is that, when one takes 
this attempt seriously, one will tend to become skeptical or relativistic. (Har-
man, 1984, p. 34; emphasis added) 
Now, perhaps not all naturalistic approaches to ethics must be skeptical or 
relativistic. Perhaps, it may be suggested, it is possible to begin with the 
naturalist's picture of the world and constraints on methodology and still end 
up with a workable, objective and non-relativistic ethical theory. Indeed, it 
may be possible, but I, for one, am not sanguine about its chances, and the 
history of philosophy is fairly littered with failed attempts at such. Most of 
us are familiar, for instance, with the litany of complaints which has been 
lodged against Mill's alleged proof of his principle of utility, and I personally 
am inclined to agree with Sidgwick's gloomy judgment that utilitarianism 
cannot be reconciled with rational egoism without recourse to some transcen-
dent aspect of reality. Obviously, utilitarianism is just one example and per-
sonal confession is no substitute for argument. I can't argue the point here, 
so I will merely record my doubts about successful, non-relativistic ethics 
born of philosophical naturalism. In any event, I will confine my remarks to 
relativistic or non-objective naturalistic theories of morality. 
Anyway, if the naturalist cannot regard morality as something objective or 
universal, she will, naturally enough, regard it as something sUbjective or 
relative, created rather than discovered, or perhaps even a colossal mistake 
altogether. Either way, morality turns out to be very different from what the 
ordinary person thinks it is, and when the ordinary person makes a moral 
judgment, she does something very different from what she thinks she is 
doing. 
The naturalist's account of what morality and moral judgment tum out to be 
can vary, and will depend to a certain extent on other aspects of the total world 
view in question. I shall layout what I take to be three important naturalistic 
treatments of morality, beginning with a version of moral relativism. 
Moral relativism is, of course, notoriously difficult to frame in a way that 
is neither self-contradictory nor trivially true. Perhaps the clearest and most 
forceful interpretation of relativism is "code relativism," of the sort defined 
by Harman.9 According to code relativism, since there is no place in the world 
as described by science for objective values, moral judgments can't sensibly 
involve, or be about, such things. Consequently, moral judgments or value judg-
ments are best understood as expressing the customs, ideals, or expectations of 
a particular group or person. Every moral judgment, then, is implicitly relativized 
to the code of some group or person, much the way that every traffic law, for 
instance, is relativized, or makes references, to the laws of some state or country. 
That is, just as the claim "Right-hand turns on red are legal" is better interpreted 
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as, "Right-hand turns on red are legal according to the laws of (say) Virginia," 
so the moral claim "Humility is good," is better interpreted as "Humility is 
good according to the traditional Judeo-Christian code." 
Obviously, on this view morality is neither universal nor necessary, since 
theoretically there can be divergence between codes on virtually every point. 
The same thing can be good according to one code and bad according to 
another, and there can be no code-independent moral adjudication between 
codes. The code relativist can still make moral judgments, but when these 
judgments range over someone holding a different code, the holder of the 
other code need not care about the judgments or regard them as binding her. 
So, if the code relativist catches Smith doing X, and points out that, "Anyone 
who does X violates her duty according to code C," Smith may respond, "That 
may be, but according to code S, which I accept, doing X does not violate 
some duty." 
The code relativist may force Smith to stop what she was doing, or persuade 
her to stop, but there is no code-independent way in which Smith was just 
"plain, old wrong," and no way which Smith need morally to accept. The 
"bite" of moral criticism, therefore, is seriously weakened, but so far as I 
know, both the champions and the critics of code relativism recognize this 
implication. 
More radical, perhaps, than code relativism is the second naturalistic ac-
count of morality which 1 shall examine, moral subjectivism. Like the code 
relativist, the moral subjectivist assumes that there is no place in the world 
as described by science for absolute values, and similarly concludes that 
moral judgments and value judgments must be about something else. Accord-
ing to the moral subjectivist, however, such judgments do not express codes 
so much as personal feelings or attitudes. lo Bertrand Russell seems to have 
held such a view when he said, 
... when we assert that this or that has 'value,' we are giving expression to 
our own emotion, not to a fact which would still be true if our personal 
feelings were different. (Russell, 1935, p. 242) 
So, moral judgments are relativized to the speaker's attitudes in much the 
same way as statements of taste are. Just as the judgment "This cheeseburger 
is great" is better understood as the exclamation "I heartily approve of this 
cheeseburger!," so the judgment "Humility is good," is better understood as 
the exclamation "I approve of humility!" 
Again, morality turns out to be neither universal nor necessary, since per-
sonal feelings can and do vary widely on virtually every point. The same 
thing can be approved of by one person and disapproved of by another, and 
there can be no feeling-independent moral adjudication of feelings. The moral 
subjectivist can, of course, still make moral judgments, but as before, when 
they range over a person with different feelings and attitudes, that person will 
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not necessarily care about these judgments or regard them as binding on her. 
So, if the moral subjectivist catches Smith doing X, and exclaims, "I disap-
prove of X," Smith may respond, "That's somewhat interesting, but I approve 
of X." As before, the moral subjectivist may be able to get her to stop, but 
there is no feeling-or-attitude-independent sense in which Smith is wrong, 
nor any which she need morally to accept. Again, the bite of moral criticism 
is seriously weakened, and again, this implication is recognized by both the 
friends and foes of moral subjectivism. 
More radical still than either moral subjectivism or code relativism is the 
third naturalistic approach to morality which I shall consider, moral nihilism. 
The moral nihilist agrees with both the code relativist and the moral subjec-
tivist that there are no objective values, but concludes that since moral judg-
ments and unavoidably about objective values (or involve them), moral 
judgments are, strictly speaking, false. In fact, moral nihilism is called the 
"error theory" by one of its chief proponents, J. L. Mackie, who writes 
Moral skepticism must, therefore, take the form of an error theory, admitting that 
a belief in objective values is built into ordinary moral thought and language, but 
holding that this ingrained belief is false. (Mackie, 1977, pp. 48,49) 
So, according to the moral nihilist all, or nearly all, positive moral judgments 
are false in the way that certain other categories of judgment which refer to 
non-existent things are false. That is, the judgment "Humility is good" is just as 
false as the judgment "Phlogiston is abundant," and for a similar reason. Clearly, 
the moral nihilist cannot make positive moral judgments at all, and if she catches 
Smith doing X and is tempted to judge Smith's doing X as morally wrong, she 
had better restrain herself, since on her own view, the only things that could 
possibly command the sort of assent requisite for a moral judgment simply do 
not exist. In sum, moral criticism loses its bite altogether on this view, and moral 
nihilists and their critics alike recognize this fact. 
Naturalistic Ethics and the Argument From Evil 
Having surveyed what are perhaps the three dominant naturalistic treat-
ments of morality, I think that the conclusion I wish to draw is by now 
obvious: the philosopher who accepts anyone of these approaches is in no 
position to offer or take the argument from evil as a strong reason for atheism. 
The argument from evil is an essentially moral argument in that it relies on 
at least one moral judgment as a premise or as a reason for a premise, but 
each of these three naturalistic treatments of morality undercuts the use of 
any such moral premises. 1l 
Consider, according to these three views, the status of 
(4) If there were an all-good God, he would want there to be little or no 
evil in the world 
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According to the code relativist, (4) is better read as 
(4*) If there were a God who was all-good according to code C, he would 
want there to be little or no evil in the world. 
and simply reflects (presumably) the speaker's code. Yet, code C is not 
necessarily the same as the theist's code (let alone God's); moreover, if this 
is so, there need be no code-independent reason for the theist (or God) to 
hold code C.12 So, if code C is not the theist's code, then the conclusion of 
the argument from evil is of little concern to the theist. At most, the argument 
from evil, when offered by the code relativist, yields 
(3*) Therefore, there is no all-powerful God who is all-good according to 
code C; 
that is, that an all-powerful God, all-good according to the relativist's code, 
doesn't exist. This does nothing to show that an all-powerful God, good accord-
ing to the theist's code, does not exist, or that the code relativist should not 
believe in that God, and certainly is nothing for the theist to be alarmed about. 
Similarly, according to the moral subjectivist, (4) is better reinterpreted as 
(4**) If there were a God of whom I completely approved, then he would 
want a world with little or no evil in it 
and merely expresses the attitudes or feelings of the speaker. Yet, if the 
attitudes or feelings of the theist differ on this point from those of the moral 
subjectivist-as we might expect-then this limits the significance of the 
argument from evil. At most, it yields 
(3**) Therefore, there is no all-powerful God of whom I (the subjectivist) 
completely approve. 
It does nothing to show that a God of whom the theist approves does not 
exist, or that the moral relativist should not believe in that God, and again, 
is nothing for the theist to worry aboutY 
According to the ethical nihilist, premise (4) is in even worse shape than it is 
according to the other two positions we have examined. According to moral 
nihilism, all positive moral claims are false, so (4) is false, pure and simple. The 
implications of this point are also simple: since a proof should contain no false 
premises, the moral nihilist cannot regard this argument as a proof of atheism, 
since on her own view it is unsound and shows nothing at all. 14 
Conclusion 
This conclusion, therefore, seems inevitable: the naturalist (or anyone else) 
who holds any of these three accounts of morality-or of value generally-can-
not take or offer the argument from evil as a reason to disbelieve in the existence 
of the God of the theist. In fact, as we have seen, the moral nihilist cannot take 
the argument from evil as yielding any religiously interesting conclusion at all. 15 
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Before closing, a few comments and qualifications are in order. First, this 
argument obviously does not apply to all naturalists. It does not apply to those 
naturalists who are agnostics rather than atheists. It does not apply to those 
atheists who believe in the non-existence of God for reasons other than the 
argument from evil. It does not apply, finally, to those naturalists who can 
consistently offer a non-relativistic, non-subjectivistic ethical theory accord-
ing to which they support some premise such as (4). Earlier in this paper I 
gave admittedly short shrift to non-relative, non-subjective and non-nihilist 
naturalistic ethical theories. Note that even if such things are possible, it 
doesn't immediately follow that (4) will be true on such a theory. One would 
have to develop such a theory and draw out its implications in order to decide 
whether (4) was among them. 
Second, it may be worth reconsidering the possibility that a version of the 
argument from evil could be offered which neither contains, nor depends on, 
any premises which are moral judgments. Still, it is difficult to imagine how 
it would even begin, since if the aim of the argument from evil is to show 
that an all-good all-powerful God does not exist, the argument seems indel-
ibly moral or evaluative from the outset. 
Third, while not taking the argument as a reason for atheism itself, the 
naturalist can still try to offer the argument as an ad hominem argument that 
anyone who holds the non-relativistic ethical theory that the theist in fact 
holds should reject theism. 16 That is, even if the naturalist does not believe 
premises (1) and (2), she can argue that the theist must (or at least does) hold 
them and that these jointly entail (3), which conflicts with theism. Since few 
theists these days deny (2), the real issue is whether the naturalist can show 
that the theist must, or does, accept (1). In the present context, this boils down 
to whether the naturalist can show that the theist must, or does accept (4), 
and this is a tall order. While some theists do accept (4) or ought to, given 
their other philosophical commitments, it is by no means obvious that all do 
or even should, since, for theists, the acceptability of (4) depends to some 
extent on the truth about morality, and even among theists there is consider-
able disagreement about just what this is. In sum, it's not as if the naturalist 
can point to a definite set of moral propositions which all theists must share 
and say, "See! These commit you to (4)!" And the theist should be wary of 
letting her critic pin some definite moral theory on her, since it may be 
difficult to say what moral theory a world view commits us to, except from 
a vantage point "inside" it, as it were. 17 Moreover, the theist might well regard 
the ability to "handle" the problem of evil as a condition of adequacy for any 
theistic theory of morality. Finally, such an ad hominem argument does not 
satisfy the conditions for a disproof of the existence of an all-good, all-pow-
erful God. IS 
Hampden-Sydney College 
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NOTES 
1. Of course, some orthodox Christian thinkers such as Augustine seem to have denied 
just this, insisting that evil does not, strictly speaking, exist, since it is a privation of being. 
Still, these thinkers could reformulate (2) to claim that there exist many things which suffer 
a severe privation of being. Also, it is worth pointing out that Augustine need not be 
interpreted as claiming that evil does not exist, but rather that evil is not a thing. 
2. See Plantinga (1974), pp. 7-65. 
3. I can want to do X and be able to do X, but not do X, simply because doing X may 
be incompatible with doing Y, which I want to do more. Of course, any sophisticated 
version of the argument from evil would be framed so as to avoid these difficulties. 
4. For my purposes, I shall, simplistically perhaps, define a moral argument as one 
whose conclusion is a moral judgment, or which has among its premises at least one moral 
judgment. A moral judgment is a judgment about what things, actions, or persons are 
morally good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious. 
5. By "naturalism" in ethics, I do not specifically intend the meta-ethical thesis that the 
terms of moral discourse can be defined in purely non-moral terms, though this thesis 
could be one example of the overall naturalistic approach to morality discussed here. 
6. Of course, the theses of naturalism and the claims of current science are not identical. 
One can be a scientist without being a naturalist, or vice versa. 
7. Robert Westmoreland has pointed out the need to distinguish between what I call 
naturalistic ethics and what may be called ethics which are compatible with philosophical 
naturalism. I take the difference to be this: what I call naturalistic ethics are ethical theories 
developed on the premise that value and obligation must first be "located" in the world 
of nature as revealed by science. On the other hand, ethics which are compatible with 
naturalism are ethical theories which, it is alleged, are compatible with the overall 
naturalistic picture of the world. These may include naturalistic ethics of the first sort, but 
may also include, interestingly, theories which purport to be compatible with virtually any 
metaphysics. For an example of this latter view, see Ronald Dworkin (1985), pp. 171-77. 
8. For other examples of this naturalistic treatment of morality, see Harman (1977, 1984). 
9. See especially Harman (1977). A similar version of relativism is developed and 
criticized by Jorge Garcia (1988). 
10. I am lumping together under the general heading of subjectivism both classical subjec-
tivists and classical emotivists. While I am aware of the significant differences between these 
positions, they share the relevant feature of believing that ethical judgments are best understood 
as expressing, being about, or being indexed to, the subjective states of humans. 
11. In the foregoing discussion, I have tended to emphasize moral judgments concerning 
rightness and obligation. William Alston has pointed out that, in addition to judgments 
concerning moral rightness and obligation, the argument from evil usually involves 
evaluative judgments as well (e.g., premise (2». These judgments are vulnerable to the 
same problem that I raise against those concerning rightness and obligation. For example, 
if a judgment about evil such as (2) must be relativized to the naturalist's code, then 
references to evil in (1) and (4) will have to be similarly relativized in order to keep the 
argument valid, but then (4) will become: 
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(4') If there were a God all-good according to the naturalist's code, he would want 
there to be in the world little or no evil according to the naturalist's code 
which, when plugged into the subsequent argument, does not yield a conclusion which 
touches the theist. 
12. In fact, I should think it very unlikely that the moral code of a naturalistic relativist 
would be identical, or even largely similar, to that of a theist, especially of the traditional 
Judeo-Christian sort. This seems especially unlikely with respect to the issue at hand-the 
evaluation of world-makers, a category largely absent from naturalistic discussion. 
13. Peter Geach makes a similar point in passing when he notes that "It is mere 
impertinence for someone who holds a non-cognitive view of our ascribing good and evil 
to persons or actions to pretend that on his footing there is any problem of evil at all. If 
my moral code, let us say, is a system of imperatives that 1 freely choose to promulgate, 
or if it amounts to saying 'I approve of this and 1 hope you will too; -then it is merely 
grotesque to imagine this sort of thing addressed to God. We have here a mirror image of 
the error that God decrees good and evil arbitrarily. Only of course if it were so, we should 
have to respect his decrees; and he needn't respect ours" (Geach, 1972, p. 39). 
14. Of course, the thinking nihilist can dispense with anything so indirect as the 
argument from evil and assert that theism must be false, since it is on its face incompatible 
with nihilism. That is, if all positive moral claims are false, then it is false that there exists 
an all-powerful, ail-good God. 
15. All of this does yield the curious conclusion that one way the theist could avoid the 
argument from evil would be to establish moral relativism or moral subjectivism-though 
how a theist could regard these moves as acceptable is beyond me. 
16. Here, 1 mean 'ad hominem argument' in the literal sense, that is, an argument aimed 
at some specific person, in this case the person who accepts theism and also a full-blooded, 
non-relativistic ethical theory. 
17. In so saying, I do not mean to endorse a sort of theistic relativism or subjectivism. Rather, 
1 mean only to suggest that a theist-particularly a theist within some particular religious 
tradition such as Judaism or Christianity-might reasonably suppose that "living out" that 
world view puts one in a better position to flesh out the antecedently unsettled details of that 
world view; better, that is, than that of one who is not living out that world view. 
18. 1 wish to thank William Bracken, Richard Creel, Hugh Fleetwood, and Robert 
Westmoreland for numerous helpful comments and criticisms on this paper; Jane Hoiland 
and Pauline Brand Nelson for help in preparing the manuscript; and Hampden-Sydney 
College for a research grant supporting this project. 1 presented earlier drafts to the Virginia 
Philosophical Association, the American Philosophical Association, and the Society of 
Christian Philosophers, and benefited from the comments of many, including William 
Alston, James Arieti, Jorge Garcia, James Harris, David James, Penelope Mackie, John 
Marshall, Philip Quinn, and David Schrader. 
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